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Abortion Stigma: The Legacy of Casey
Paula Abrams
“While we find no reliable data to measure the phenomenon,
it seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to
regret their choice to abort the infant life they once
created and sustained. Severe depression and loss of esteem
can follow.“1
This passage from Gonzalez v. Carhart2 has been the subject of
extensive criticism, primarily because the Supreme Court relies on
unsupported assertions of regret and psychological harm to
characterize a woman’s decision to terminate her pregnancy.3

The

existence of “post-abortion syndrome”, to which this text alludes, has
been thoroughly debunked by medical research.4 However, the passage is
notable for another reason: the Court fails to show any interest in
why women might experience harmful emotions.

Indeed, the Court



Edward Brunet Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark Law School. I wish to thank
the participants at Beyond Roe: Reproductive Justice in a Changing World, at
Rutgers Law School, Camden, and Kate Cockrill, for their insights into stigma
and reproductive justice. Thanks also to the excellent research assistance of
Michelle Enfield.
1

Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007).

2

Id.

3

See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Adjudging a Moral Harm to Women From Abortions,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2007, at A18; Supreme Court Upholds Federal Abortion Ban,
Opens Door for Further Restrictions by States, 10 GUTTMACHER POL’Y. REV., Spring
2007, at 19, 19; Carhart, 550 U.S. at 183–85 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
4

BRENDA MAJOR ET AL., APA TASK FORCE ON MENTAL HEALTH AND ABORTION: REPORT OF THE APA TASK
FORCE ON MENTAL HEALTH AND ABORTION 90–92 (2008) [hereinafter APA TASK FORCE ON MENTAL
HEALTH AND ABORTION] (stating that while women’s emotions after an abortion can
be mixed, “the relative risks of mental health problems are no greater than
the risks among women who deliver an unplanned pregnancy”); see Corinne H.
Rocca et al., Women’s Emotions One Week After Receiving or Being Denied an
Abortion in the United States, 45 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 122, 126-27
(2013) (cautioning that responses to abortion should be considered separately
from responses to an unwanted pregnancy, and reporting that women feel more
negative emotions about the pregnancy than the abortion).
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presumes that emotional distress is an innate response to abortion.5
The woman who terminates her pregnancy may suffer because “[r]espect
for human life finds an ultimate expression in the bond of love the
mother has for her child.”6

This presumption is problematic for two

reasons. First, it reinforces the stereotype that a woman’s primary
role is mother.

The expectation is that positive emotions are

associated with continuing the pregnancy, and negative emotions
correlate with abortion.7 Second, by assuming that negative emotions
are tied to innate longings to be mother, the Court fails to consider
how law and culture influence the way a woman experiences abortion.8
For many women, these influences generate negative messages about
abortion and about the woman who terminates a pregnancy. A growing
body of research attests to a culture of stigma surrounding abortion.9
Abortion stigma may negatively impact a woman’s experience of
abortion.10 The faulty presumption in the Carhart passage suggests that

5

Carhart, 550 U.S. at 159.

6

Id.

7

Rocca et al., supra note 4, at 129 (finding that women who were turned away
from abortion because of the late gestational age of the fetus expressed more
anger and regret one week later than women who obtained an abortion).
8

See Carhart, 550 U.S. at 159 (discussing that “women [may] come to regret”
their decision to have an abortion); see also Rocca et. al, supra note 4, at
129 (“[W]e found that the main variables associated with experiencing
primarily negative emotions were aspects of the pregnancy decision-making
process and social environment.”).
9

Rocca et. al., supra note 4, at 129; Katrina Kimport,(Mis)Understanding
Abortion Regret, 35 SYMBOLIC INTERACTION 105, 106 (2012) [hereinafter
(Mis)Understanding Abortion Regret].
10

See (Mis)Understanding Abortion Regret, supra note 9, at 111.
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it is the abortion itself that produces harmful emotions;11 the Court
should instead direct its scrutiny at how abortion stigma is
generated.
Nearly half of the pregnancies in the United States are
unintended.12 About forty percent of these unintended pregnancies will
be terminated by abortion.13 However, the frequency of abortion is
rarely acknowledged in political discourse. Instead, a culture of
deviancy has developed around abortion. In many states abortion is
subject to regulations not imposed on other medical procedures.14 Women
who decide to terminate pregnancies may feel marginalized navigating
laws that question their judgment and moral authority, imposing
invasive mandatory ultrasounds, biased counseling sessions and onerous
waiting periods.15 Approximately forty percent of Americans say they do
not know a woman who has had an abortion, a perception that is

11

See Carhart, 550 U.S. at 159 (“Whether to have an abortion requires a
difficult and painful moral decision[,] . . . . [which] some women come to
regret[.]”).
12

Facts Sheet: Induced Abortion in the United States, GUTTMACHER INST.,
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fb_induced_abortion.html (last updated Feb.
2014) [hereinafter Facts Sheet].
13

Id.

14

See Amalia W. Jorns, Challenging Warrantless Inspections of Abortion
Providers: A New Constitutional Strategy, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1563, 1565–70
(2005) (“TRAP laws are generally defined as laws that single out physicians’
offices and outpatient clinics where abortions are performed, and subject
them to wide-ranging medical, administrative, and facility requirements that
are not imposed on comparable medical facilities.”).
15

See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1 (West 2011) (voluntary and
informed consent requirement); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2153 (West Supp. 2012)
(counseling and waiting period requirement); WIS. STAT. § 253.10(3)(f) (West
Supp. 2013) (mandatory ultrasound requirement).
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unlikely to be supported by fact, given the commonness of abortion.16
This statistic provides insight into the culture of secrecy that
surrounds abortion.
Public attitudes towards abortion have remained fairly consistent
since Roe v. Wade was decided in 1973.17 Although a majority of
Americans favor the legality of abortion in general, that majority has
decreased in recent years.18 Approval deviates sharply depending on the
reason for the abortion.19 Substantial majorities support abortion as a
response to serious health risk, rape, or serious fetal anomalies.20 In
contrast, there is less than majority support for abortion in
instances of social, economic, or personal hardship.21
Support for legal abortion in instances of economic or personal
hardship has generally declined since 1992, when the Supreme Court
decided Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey22 and

16

Kate Cockrill & Adina Nack, “I’m Not That Type of Person”: Managing the
Stigma of Having an Abortion, 34 DEVIANT BEHAV. 973, 973 (2013).
17

See TOM W. SMITH & JAESOK SON, TRENDS IN PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARDS ABORTION 2, 7 (2013)
(“Support for the legalization of abortions moved up notably between 1972 and
1973 following the Supreme Court’s Roe vs. [sic] Wade decision in January,
1973.”).
18

Id. at 6-7.

19

Id.

20

Id. at 2, 6. (“Approval of abortion is highest when the woman’s health is
seriously endangered (87.0% . . .), followed by for pregnancies resulting
from rape (78.3%), and a serious defect in the fetus (77.1%).”).
21

Id. at 2, 6–7. (“But majorities have not approved where the family is too
poor to afford another child (45.0%), when a married woman does not want more
children (42.1%), when the woman is unmarried and does not want to marry the
prospective father (42.0%), and when the woman wants the abortion for ‘any
reason’ (38.5%) . . .).”).
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opened the door to greater regulation of abortion.23 This decline is
significant given the demographic changes that have occurred since
Roe. The increasing presence of women in the workplace, more
permissive attitudes towards sex outside marriage, and generally
greater support for equality between men and women suggest there
should be substantial cultural support for reproductive autonomy.24
But data showing underreporting of abortions, concealment, and
fear of social ostracizing strongly suggest that for many women,
abortion is associated with stigma.25 Prior to Roe, when abortion was
criminalized, it was common that women who obtained abortions
perceived or experienced stigma and a need for secrecy.26 Why, forty
years after Roe, is this still the experience of many women who choose
abortion?
Casey’s shift from strict scrutiny to the undue burden standard
has changed the landscape of abortion regulation.27 More than 755
restrictions on abortion have been enacted since Casey issued in

22

505 U.S. 833 (1992).

23

SMITH & SON, supra note 17, at 7.

24

Ted G. Jelen & Clyde Wilcox, Causes and Consequences of Public Attitudes
Toward Abortion: A Review and Research Agenda, 56 POL. RES. Q. 489, 491 (2003).
25

Anuradha Kumar et al., Conceptualizing Abortion Stigma, 11 CULTURE, HEALTH &
SEXUALITY 625, 629 (2009).
26

Richard W. Bourne, Abortion in 1938 and Today: Plus Ça Change, Plus C'est
La Même Chose, 12 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 225, 229, 273 (2003).
27

See Michael J. New, Analyzing the Effect of Anti-Abortion U.S. State
Legislation in the Post-Casey Era, 11 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 28, 29 (2011) (noting
the increase in informed consent laws, waiting period requirements, and
parental involvement laws between the years 1992 and 2005).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2519798

1992.28 Casey’s significance is not only the Court’s holding that a
restriction on abortion will be upheld unless it creates an “undue
burden” on a woman’s decision to terminate a pregnancy.29 Casey, by
finding that the state may express its preference for childbirth
throughout the pregnancy, allows the state to use its considerable
persuasive power to discourage a woman from terminating her
pregnancy.30 Many of the laws enacted since Casey serve this state
interest by stigmatizing abortion and the woman who chooses abortion.
Abortion is stigmatized as a medical procedure through laws that
separate reproductive health services from mainstream medicine.31
Waiting periods, mandated ultrasounds, prohibitions on late-term
abortions, fetal pain and personhood laws, and onerous informed
consent requirements typically convey a message of moral disapproval
of abortion.32 These laws seek to discourage abortion by associating

28

Cumulative Number of Anti-Choice Measures Enacted Since 1995, NARAL PRO
CHOICE AMERICA, http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/government-and-you/stategovernments/cumulative-number-of.html (last visited May 25, 2014).
29

Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877
(1992).
30

Id. at 871–78.

31

See, e.g., 2013 TEX. Gen. Laws 4795–4802 (to be codified at TEX. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE §§ 171.0031, 171.041–048, 171.061–064, & amending §§ 245.010–.011;
TEX. OCC. CODE amending §§ 164.052 & 164.055) (requiring doctors performing
abortions to have hospital admitting privileges within thirty miles and
restricting medication abortions); Planned Parenthood of Greater Texas
Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 951 F. Supp. 2d 891, 902, 909 (W.D. Tex.
2013) (enjoining the hospital admitting privileges requirement as
unconstitutional); Planned Parenthood of Greater Texas Surgical Health Servs.
v. Abbott, 734 F.3d 406, 409 (5th Cir. 2013) (granting Texas’ appeal and
emergency motion to the court requesting the injunction be stayed pending
appeal).
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abortion with shame and disgust.

The perception or experience of

social stigma advances a culture of secrecy around abortion.33 Secrecy
perpetuates the misconception that abortion is uncommon, further
marginalizing the procedure.34 The cycle of stigma and secrecy
reinforces the state’s expression of moral disapproval and promotes
further restrictions.
This article examines recent empirical data concerning abortion
stigma and considers the role of abortion stigma in judicial review of
laws regulating abortion. Evidence of abortion stigma is relevant to
judicial analysis of whether a restriction on abortion constitutes an
undue burden under Casey.

This article argues that evidence of stigma

may reveal whether a restriction has an impermissible purpose or
effect, or is based upon impermissible gender stereotyping. Abortion
stigma derives from stereotypes that identify women as mothers and
nurturers; a woman who terminates her pregnancy may be stigmatized for
failing to conform to social norms.35
Abortion restrictions based primarily on moral disapproval or
gender stereotyping are problematic under Casey. The intentional

32

See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36–2153 (West Supp. 2012) (informed
consent); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14–02.1–03.5 (West 2011) (regulating
medication abortions); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1–738.2 (West Supp. 2014)
(voluntary and informed consent); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012 (West
Supp. 2012) (voluntary and informed consent); WIS. STAT. § 253.10(3) (West
Supp. 2013) (mandatory ultrasound).
33

See generally Cockrill & Nack, supra note 16 (discussing “how aspects of
abortion stigma-such as its concealability and episodic expression-interfere”
with women’s ability to manage the stigma surrounding abortions).
34

See, e.g., id. at 984.

35

See, e.g., Kumar et al., supra note 25, at 628.
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stigmatization of abortion violates Casey’s prohibition against laws
that have the purpose of imposing a substantial obstacle on a woman’s
choice.36

Restrictions on abortion demand particular scrutiny because

the potential for gender stereotyping implicates both liberty and
equality interests. The increasing prevalence of state laws that
stigmatize abortion provides persuasive justification for judicial
analysis of the relationship between abortion restrictions and gender
stereotyping. Abortion laws based on gender stereotyping should be
considered an undue burden under Casey.37
Part I of this article examines foundational theories regarding
stigma. Part II looks specifically at stigma as it relates to
abortion. Part III discusses the historical sources of abortion
stigma. Part IV reviews and summarizes current data on abortion
stigma. Part V looks at the relationship between abortion restrictions
and stigma. Part VI examines the relevance of stigma to the Casey
undue burden test. Part VII considers the role of stigma in abortion
regulation since Casey. Parts VIII and IX argue that laws intended to
stigmatize abortion constitute an undue burden under Casey. Part VIII
analyzes how laws that have the purpose of stigmatizing abortion
constitute an undue burden.

Part IX examines how evidence of abortion

stigma is relevant to judicial analysis of gender stereotyping.38

36

See generally Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992) (analyzing the validity of laws concerning abortion using the
“undue burden” test).
37

Id.
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I.

Stigma
Human experience inevitably involves differentiation and

labeling.39 Culturally imposed stereotypes are endemic in any society.40
Some differentiation has substantial social power, particularly
distinctions based on race and gender.41 Labeling and stereotyping
based on these characteristics may be “automatic and facilitate
‘cognitive efficiency.’”42 Individuals who deviate from these cultural
expectations may experience stigma.
Erving Goffman defines stigma as an “attribute that is deeply
discrediting,” that reduces the bearer “from a whole and usual person
to a tainted, discounted one.”43 Various definitions of stigma have
emerged since Goffman’s breakthrough research but most agree that
stigma (1) concerns an attribute that marks an individual as different
or “other” and (2) is socially constructed.44 Stigma is most commonly

38

See Neil S. Siegel, Symposium on Living Originalism: The New Textualism,
Progressive Constitutionalism, and Abortion Rights: A Reply to Jeffrey Rosen,
25 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 55, 64 (2013) [hereinafter A Reply to Jeffrey Rosen].
39

Bruce G. Link & Jo C. Phelan, Conceptualizing Stigma, 27 ANN. REV. OF SOC.
363, 367 (2001).
40

ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 2 (1963) (These
culturally imposed stereotypes are described as a “virtually social
identity”).
41

Link & Phelan, supra note 39.

42

Id.

43

GOFFMAN, supra note 40, at 3.

44

Kristen M. Shellenberg, Abortion Stigma in the United States: Quantitative
and Qualitative Perspectives from Women Seeking an Abortion 11 (Apr. 2010)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Johns Hopkins University) (on file with
Milton S. Eisenhower Library, The Johns Hopkins University).
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associated with a visible trait45 but may also be experienced as a
character flaw or through deviations from tribal or group identity.46
Stigma may be internalized, as when the individual accepts and
incorporates a negative cultural judgment.47 Goffman describes
internalized stigma as something that manifests when only the
individual and a “mirror are about[.]”48 Stigma also may be “felt,”
when an individual perceives that others have negative attitudes
toward the trait or the individual.49 Finally, stigma may be “enacted”
when the individual experiences negative responses from others,
prejudice or discrimination.50 Stigma may also manifest as “courtesy”
stigma, imposing negative attributes upon close relations.51
Stigma may arise because the “otherness” is physically apparent
or otherwise known52 and when the discrediting characteristic is not

45

See GOFFMAN, supra note 40, at 7, 48–51 (“[T]he standards he has
incorporated from the wider society equip him to be intimately alive to what
others see as his failing, inevitably causing him, if only for moments, to
agree that he does indeed fall short of what he really ought to be.”).
46

Id. at 4–5, 48-51 (describing stigma associated with visible physical
traits).
47

Cockrill & Nack, supra note 16, at 974; see also GOFFMAN, supra note 40, at 7
(discussing visibility and its relationship to stigma and how visibility
“must be distinguished from . . . the known-about-ness of the attribute, its
obtrusiveness, and its perceived focus.”).
48

GOFFMAN, supra note 40, at 7.

49

Cockrill & Nack, supra note 16, at 974.

50

Id.

51

GOFFMAN, supra note 40, at 30.

52

Id. at 4 (describing this experience as one of being discredited).
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evident or known by others.53 In the latter situation, the individual
must decide how to “manage . . . undisclosed discrediting information”
about the attribute.54 These strategies may include concealing the
negative attribute or actively lying, trying to “pass” as someone
without the stigmatizing trait.55 Typically, the individual in this
situation is highly motivated to avoid disclosure of the stigmatizing
characteristic.56
II.

Abortion Stigma
Most abortions occur as a result of unintended pregnancies.57 The

decision to terminate a pregnancy may be a difficult one. The way an
individual thinks about an event, or “frames” it, impacts the
experience of that event.58 Framing depends in part on perceptions of
what an individual perceives she should think or feel.59 Sociocultural

53

Id. (describing this individual as discreditable).

54

Id. at 42.

55

Id. (“To display or not to display; to tell or not to tell; to let on or
not to let on; to lie or not to lie; and in each case, to whom, how, when,
and where.”).
56

Id.

57

Brenda Major et al., Abortion and Mental Health: Evaluating the Evidence,
64 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 863, 865 (2009) [hereinafter Abortion and Mental Health]
(stating that these unintended pregnancies are “either mistimed pregnancies
that would have been wanted at an earlier or later date or unwanted
pregnancies that were not wanted at that time or at any time in the future”).
58

Arlie Russell Hochschild, Emotion Work, Feeling Rules, and Social
Structure, 85 AM. J. SOC. 551, 566–67 (1979) (“Sets of feeling rules contend
for a place in people’s minds as a governing standard with which to compare
the actual lived experience of . . . the abortion . . . .”).
59

Id. at 567.
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messages about how a woman “‘should’ or ‘will’” experience abortion
can “create a self-fulfilling prophecy[.]”60
The social context in which most women experience abortion is
largely negative.61 The lack of public awareness about the commonness
of abortion, highly “polariz[ed] political discourse” and public
ambivalence about acceptable circumstances for abortion contribute to
a socio-political culture that often assigns negative public status to
abortion.62
Abortion stigma can be defined as a “negative attribute ascribed
to women who seek to terminate a pregnancy that marks them, internally
or externally, as inferior to ideals of womanhood.”63 These ideals
evoke traditional stereotypes that accept “female sexuality solely for
procreation,” identify women as mothers and expect “instinctual
nurturance” and self-sacrificing behavior.64 “Women who [terminate
pregnancies] may have good reason” to anticipate stigma for failure to
conform to these social expectations.65

60

Abortion and Mental Health, supra note 57, at 867.

61

See, e.g., id.; Lisa L. Littman, et al., Introducing Abortion Patients to a
Culture of Support: A Pilot Study, 12 ARCHIVES OF WOMEN’S MENTAL HEALTH 419, 421
(2009) (“Several negative frames of discourse about abortions are common,
contribute to the cultural context about abortion, and very strongly express
disapproval about an abortion.”); Brenda Major & Richard H. Gramzow, Abortion
as Stigma: Cognitive and Emotional Implications of Concealment, 77 J. OF
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 735, 735 (1999).
62

Cockrill & Nack, supra note 16.

63

Kumar et al., supra note 25, at 628.

64

Id.

65

Major & Gramzow, supra note 61.
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Accumulated empirical data concludes that many women experience
abortion as a stigmatizing event.66 A woman’s perception of negative
attitudes toward abortion correlates with her desire to keep the
abortion secret or allow only selective disclosure.67 Perception of
stigma and the related perceived need for secrecy are key factors
leading to negative psychological responses following first-trimester
abortion among women in the United States.68 Abortion stigma can lead
to delays in arranging the procedure, creating potentially greater
health and legal obstacles.69 Stigma may also lead women to seek out
unsafe options to avoid disclosure, including self-induction or
untrained personnel.70
Because abortion is typically a concealable act, abortion stigma
may be episodic or intermittent, arising during certain events or
experiences.71 The internalization or perception of stigma may
fluctuate over time.72 The psychological repercussions of abortion

66

See Abortion and Mental Health, supra note 57, at 867; Littman et al.,
supra note 61; Major & Gramzow, supra note 61.
67

Kate Cockrill et al., The Stigma of Having an Abortion: Development of a
Scale and Characteristics of Women Experiencing Abortion Stigma, 45 PERSP. ON
SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH, 79, 80 (2013).
68

Major & Gramzow, supra note 61, at 741–42. (Other factors include the
extent to which a woman wanted and felt committed to her pregnancy, perceived
self-efficacy for coping with the abortion, low actual or anticipated social
support for the abortion decision, and use of avoidance and denial coping
strategies).
69

Shellenberg, supra note 44, at 200.

70

Id.

71

Cockrill & Nack, supra note 16, at 975.

72

Id.
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stigma vary, depending on the significance of the stigma to selfidentity.73 Psychological consequences of stigma may be “profound.”74
Social psychologist Brenda Major explains, “Women who come to
internalize stigma associated with abortion (e.g., who see themselves
as tainted, flawed, or morally deficient) are likely to be
particularly vulnerable to later psychological distress.”75
Social inequalities and power disparities are important to the
creation of stigma. Restrictions on access to abortion are
particularly burdensome to low-income women, who in many states must
navigate an array of regulatory impediments.76 Costly regulations drive
abortion providers that serve low-income women out of business.77 In
many states, a woman must travel long distances to find a provider.78
She then may face a twenty-four-hour waiting period that requires an
overnight stay and time away from home and work.79

Exclusion of

73

See Abortion and Mental Health, supra note 57, at 867 (discussing that
women who accept the negative stereotypes associated with abortion are more
vulnerable psychologically).
74

Id.

75

Id.

76

See THEODORE J. JOYCE ET AL., GUTTMACHER INST., THE IMPACT OF STATE MANDATORY COUNSELING
WAITING PERIOD LAWS ON ABORTION: A LITERATURE REVIEW 11 (2009) (citing one survey
that showed costs for low-income women increased by forty-eight percent when
a second visit to the provider was required).
AND

77

See Tara Culp-Ressler, Since Ohio Is Forcing Abortion Clinics Out Of
Business, More Women Are Leaving The State To Get Care, THINKPROGRESS (Oct. 25,
2013, 12:36 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/health/2013/10/25/2837461/ohioabortion-state-lines/ (reporting an influx of out-of-state women seeking
abortion in states where abortion policies are less restricted, since the
restrictive policies in their states are forcing clinics to shut down).
78

Id.; Shellenberg, supra note 44, at 9.
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abortion coverage from public and private health care further impedes
access. Increasingly, women must find the resources to travel and sit
out the waiting period, and then must pay for the procedure out of
pocket.80 Abortion is devolving, in many states, to a procedure
available primarily to the well-to-do.81
Unmarried women also suffer stigma regarding childbearing
decisions.82 A single woman’s decision to have an abortion often is
motivated by a desire to avoid the stigma associated with unwed
motherhood.83 Single women report fear, isolation, and shame for
themselves and on behalf of their families.84 Secrecy dominates the
experience.85 In one study of unmarried woman every respondent who
terminated a pregnancy reported feelings of stigma; all decided to
keep the abortion secret, never disclosing it to family members.86
These women reported fears of social disapproval, particularly of

79

See id. at 24 (chart listing states with mandatory waiting period and
insurance coverage restriction).
80

Id.

81

Rachel Benson Gold, All That's Old Is New Again: The Long Campaign to
Persuade Women to Forego Abortion, 12 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 19, 21 (2009).
82

Marcia A. Ellison, Authoritative Knowledge and Single Women’s Unintentional
Pregnancies, Abortions, Adoption, and Single Motherhood: Social Stigma and
Structural Violence, 17 MED. ANTHROPOLOGY Q. 322, 335 (2003).
83

Id. at 331.

84

Id. at 332.

85

Id. at 331.

86

Id. at 332.
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being judged a “selfish” woman who failed social expectations of
maternity.87
The fact that abortion is a procedure that only women can
experience inevitably raises questions about the relationship between
abortion stigma and gender. Abortion stigma is a gendered construction
of deviance that taps into cultural archetypes about women and
pregnancy. Stigma is constructed through a multifaceted framework of
messages and experiences that include the beliefs of the individual
and her interactions with friends, family, the community, and
society.88 For many women, this framework depicts abortion as aberrant
and the woman who seeks an abortion as “promiscuous, sinful, selfish,
dirty, irresponsible, heartless or murderous[.]”89 The relationship
between abortion stigma and negative stereotypes of women who
terminate pregnancies is well documented.90 Women who experience
abortion stigma have learned these negative stereotypes and frequently
internalize poor self-judgments.91
III.

Sources of Abortion Stigma
Abortion stigma is rooted in historical practices and laws that

associated abortion with moral abhorrence and ostracized women who

87

Id. at 336.

88

Shellenberg, supra note 44, at 39.

89

Kumar et al., supra note 25.

90

See, e.g., Cockrill & Nack, supra note 16, at 979; Kumar et al., supra note
25 (women obtaining abortions seen as “deviant from the norm” and “bad
women”).
91

Cockrill & Nack, supra note 16, at 979.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2519798

terminated pregnancies.92 In the early 1800s, abortion was readily
available prior to quickening.93 Despite its availability, abortion was
identified with out-of-wedlock sex, promiscuity, and prostitution.94
Abortion regulation emerged in the first half of the 19th century,
when women were unable to vote in most states.95 These early laws were
the product of the emerging commercialization of medicine in general
and abortion in particular.96 Trained physicians, many of whom refused
to perform abortions, argued for laws criminalizing abortion, in large
part as a means of reducing the influence of midwives and nurses. The
American Medical Association led a highly visible campaign against
abortion.97 This campaign relied on arguments that women, dependent and
incapable of rational judgment, needed to be protected from the moral
abyss associated with abortion.98 Connecticut’s law was typical of the
anti-abortion laws of the era. Enacted in 1860, its purpose was to
assure “protection due to the woman, protection against her own

92

Bourne, supra note 26, at 229 n.15.
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JAMES C. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL POLICY, 18001900 6–7 (1978).
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See Timeline of abortion laws and events, CHI. TRIB.,
http://www.chicagotribune.com/sns-abortion-timeline,0,7911413.story (last
visited May 26, 2014); see U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (prohibiting the denial or
abridgement of the right to vote on account of sex). The amendment was
ratified in 1920. Id.
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Id. at 44.
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weakness as well as the criminal lust and greed of others.”99 Women who
sought abortion often were depicted as unwed, impoverished and
desperate.100
The late 19th century movement to criminalize abortion was
motivated in part by cultural concerns that white, middle class women
were rejecting their “roles” as childbearers and raisers.101 Although
the focus of the movement shifted somewhat from the immorality of
abortion as a matter of promiscuity, the stigma associated with
abortion remained.102 Women who sought abortion were chastised as
frivolous, self-indulgent, and small-minded.103
By the 20th century, prior to Roe, the culture of “back alley”
abortions marked abortion as criminal, dirty, and harmful to women.104
The legalization of abortion did not eliminate the stigma.105 Increased
support for abortion occurred following Roe amidst political discourse
that emphasized women’s rights and gender equality.106 Since the 1980s,
the Right-to-Life and other anti-choice social movements have fomented
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Constituents, Causes, and Consequences, 21 WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES (SUPPLEMENT) S49,
S52 (2011).
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SMITH & SON, supra note 17, at 2; see also Jennifer Strickler & Nicholas L.
Danigelis, Changing Frameworks in Attitudes Toward Abortion, 17 SOC. F. 187,
188 (2002).
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a backlash against abortion rights that has had considerable success
in reframing the political discussion of abortion.107
Opponents of abortion have tactically sought to increase the
stigma surrounding abortion by depicting abortion as deviant and
immoral.108 Legislation attributing personhood to prenatal life
correlates to data suggesting that belief in the sanctity of human
life is a consistent predictor of anti-choice attitudes.109 The “womanprotective” justification for restricting abortion promotes the
position that abortion harms women.110 These laws are intended to shift
public perception through appeals to traditional values and
stereotypes of protecting women and children.111 The public controversy
over late–term abortion, which occurs in less than two percent of
abortions, seeks to identify abortion with infanticide.112 Fetal pain
laws are intended to increase moral repugnance toward abortion.113 Prolife social movements have effectively connected abortion to broader

107

Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion
Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1713–15 (2008).
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See Olga Khazan, When Did Fetal Pain Become Pro-Life Strategy?, THE ATLANTIC
(Nov. 18, 2013, 9:00 AM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2013/11/when-did-fetal-pain-becomepro-life-strategy/281577/ (after a 1984 video purporting to show a fetus
scream upon abortion, “anti-abortion messaging focused heavily [on]
dismembered fetuses, the bloody abortion process, or the idea of fetuses
being tortured to death”).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2519798

social themes of family values.114 In doing so they have constructed a
negative frame for the discussion of abortion.115 By contrast, the
positive framing of abortion, manifested through the pro-choice
movement’s emphasis on gender equality, rights, and feminism has not
produced a notable increase in approval of abortion.116
The post-Roe backlash against legalized abortion suggests an
enduring legacy of stigma. Restrictions on access to abortion,
intrusive informed consent requirements, and laws excluding abortion
coverage from government and private health insurance marginalize
abortion.117 Terminology and framing discourse contribute to the
dissemination of abortion stigma.118 References to prenatal life as a
child or baby or to the woman who terminates a pregnancy as mother are
examples of how language generates stigma. Describing a physician who
performs an abortion as an “abortionist” is another.119 The linkage of
abortion with moral culpability, whether through public perceptions of

114

Strickler & Danigelis, supra note 106, at 200.

115
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See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 103-112, 107 Stat. 1082, 1113 (1993) [hereinafter
the Hyde Amendment].
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Kumar et al., supra note 25.
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Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 953–54 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
id. at 957–60, 964–65, 968, 974–76 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 138, 144, 154–55, 161, 163 (2007)
(illustrating Justice Kennedy’s language shift from “abortionist” to
“abortion doctor”).
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“good” reasons, or misinformation about causes of pregnancy, reveals
the persistence of stigma.120
This brief summary of the historical roots of abortion stigma
highlights the entrenched association of abortion with immorality and
gendered roles. An analysis of how abortion stigma is experienced
demonstrates that these stereotypes continue to constitute the subtext for modern debates about abortion.
IV.

Experience of Stigma
Some general comments can be made regarding data on abortion

stigma. Research into abortion stigma is relatively recent. However,
studies of abortion stigma draw on a significant body of research
concerning stigma.121 Substantial data exists on stigma related to
visible traits such as race and physical disability.122 Working from
similar theories and methodologies, research into abortion stigma
focuses on the prevalence of stigma and on the perception of stigma.123
The data demonstrates that a substantial majority of women who choose

120

See SMITH & SON, supra note 17, at 3, 7; see also Paul Kane & Nia-Malika
Henderson, Todd Akin rape comments prompt GOP to pull campaign funding, calls
to exit race, WASH. POST (Aug. 20, 2012)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/with-todd-akins-rape-commentsabortion-is-back-inthe-campaign-spotlight/2012/08/20/c497bae4-eac7-11e1-a80b9f898562d010_story.html (comments of Congressman Todd Akin of Missouri,
saying that pregnancy from “‘legitimate rape’” is rare because a woman’s body
has ways to “‘shut that whole thing down’”).
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See, e.g., Norris et al., supra note 104, at S49; Kumar et al., supra note
25, at 626.
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Link & Phelan, supra note 39, at 363–64; Scott Burris, Stigma and the Law,
367 THE LANCET 529, 531 (2006).
123

Shellenberg, supra note 44, at 17.
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abortion associate abortion with stigma and report the experience or
perception of stigma as a consequence.124
Current research on abortion stigma theorizes that women who
seek abortions experience stigma because they challenge “cultural
norms about the ‘essential nature’ of women.”125 Abortion stigma
typically is a “‘concealable’ stigma,” known to others upon
disclosure.126 Thus, women who have had abortions must decide whether
and how to reveal information in addition to coping with the impact of
the disclosure once it is revealed.127 Group dynamics and values also
affect the experience of abortion stigma.128
Researchers have argued that abortion stigma is normalized and
regenerated through a “vicious cycle” of concealment and
marginalization, defined as the “prevalence paradox.”129 Fearful of
stigma and disapproval, few women reveal their abortions.130
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Id. at S50.
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See Kumar et al., supra note 25, at 632 (“Stigma can be dangerous in
societies where women’s mobility is limited and their access to financial
resources is negligible. In contrast, women who benefit from social networks
and believe that society supports their decision to terminate a pregnancy,
such as women in the UK, may experience less grief and anxiety than those who
were unsupported by their communities or the larger environment.” (citation
omitted)).
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Id. at 629; see Norris et al., supra note 104, at S50 (“As with women who
have has abortions, none are fully in control of whether their status is
revealed by-and to-others. Consequently, those stigmatized by abortion cope
not only with the stigma once revealed, but also with managing whether or not
the stigma will be revealed.” (citation omitted)).
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nondisclosure leads to false perceptions of uncommonness.131
Uncommonness readily transforms into a norm of deviancy, promoting
further secrecy and stigma.132 Secrecy imposes additional costs: women
who hide abortions report “insomnia, panic attacks and anxiety.”133
Stigma is likely to manifest as negative self-judgments, worries
about being judged by intimates or the community, and feelings of
isolation.134 Internalized stigma produces feelings of isolation.135
Negative attitudes toward abortion are not necessarily a
consequence.136 Felt or perceived stigma may be experienced as fears of
disapproval and community condemnation, as well as perceptions of
isolation.137
Enacted stigma, actual experiences of loss of status or
discrimination, is not as commonly reported in studies of abortion
stigma.138 Fewer incidents of enacted stigma may be the result,
however, of the high incidence of concealment of abortion. Enacted
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stigma most often is experienced in interactions between patient and
protestor.139 A woman may encounter overt stigma when the abortion
decision is disclosed to the pregnancy partner, close friend, or
family.140 These encounters may lead to disruption of friendships or
relationships with her partner and/or family.141 Disclosure to a
woman’s anti-abortion medical provider is another source of enacted
stigma.142

Data suggests that internalized stigma and perceived stigma

are the key components of a woman’s experience of abortion stigma.143
Thus, abortion stigma appears to be constructed primarily through
powerful social messages that define maternity as essential to female
identity.
Research on abortion stigma to date has focused primarily on
ascertaining how a woman experiences abortion.144 Researchers have
formulated criteria for testing abortion stigma. These criteria
include feelings of isolation, “worries about judgment, . . . selfjudgment[,] and community condemnation.”145 In addition, a number of
socio-economic factors are commonly identified as relevant to
experiences of abortion stigma. The most significant factors include

139

Cockrill & Nack, supra note 16, at 981.

140

Id. at 981–82.

141

(Mis)Understanding Abortion Regret, supra note 9, at 111.
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Cockrill & Nack, supra note 16, at 981 (some women report very negative
exchanges with their regular Ob/Gyn).
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Shellenberg, supra note 44, at 183–84.
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(1) perception of stigma, (2) secrecy, (3) racial and ethnic identity,
and (4) religion.

Other influences include economics, geography,

ambivalence about the abortion decision, and misinformation.146 These
factors play a significant role in mediating abortion stigma.147
(1) Perception of Stigma
The great majority of abortion patients perceive a high degree of
stigma associated with terminating a pregnancy.148 This perception
extends to friends, family, and the broader community and culture.149 A
1993 study reports that just under half the women sampled experienced
stigma upon disclosure of an abortion.150 A more recent study concludes
that sixty-seven percent of women perceived negative judgments from
others, although that number dropped to forty percent when considering
only friends and family.151 The perception of stigma derived from
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See Shellenberg, supra note 44, at 19, 183, 194-99; Abortion and Mental
Health, supra note 57, at 871 (“[A] fourth potential sampling bias
characterized studies based on samples of women in countries with more
restrictive abortion laws. Restrictive laws may create sampling bias such
that women who meet criteria for obtaining an abortion may be a more
distressed sample prior to their abortion than women who do not meet
criteria.”); RACHEL K. JONES ET AL., GUTTMACHER INST., CHARACTERISTICS OF U.S ABORTION
PATIENTS 11 (2008) (In discussing the high percentage of women who pay for
their abortions out of pocket the article founds a surprising “similarity in
the proportion uninsured among poor and low-income women (36% and 38%
respectively). Even among women with family incomes of at least 200% of
poverty, 26% lacked health insurance.”); Littman et al., supra note 61, at
421–22 (“[M]isinformation exaggerating the risks and sequelae of abortion is
prevalent and may lower women’s expectations of how well they themselves will
cope.” (citation omitted)).
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personal conversations and from observations about how people
discussed abortion.152 Expectation of stigma extends to societal
judgments; substantial majorities of women perceive stigma due to
“‘how our society talks about women who have had an abortion,’” or
“‘how society discusses abortion.’”153
Women who perceive stigma do not necessarily experience or
internalize it.154 Most report feeling comfortable with their decision
but expect negative responses from others.155 Negative judgments from
close friends and family concern a substantial minority of women.156
These results are consistent with medical research showing no evidence
of a post-abortion “syndrome” of regret.157
Perception of stigma correlates closely with traditional negative
stereotypes assigned to women. Respondents in several studies
anticipated that others would think they were bad or immoral, sinful,
a “slut” or a bad mother.158 One respondent explains, “you’re supposed
to feel totally ashamed . . . and you’re supposed to feel like you
murdered someone and you’re supposed to punish yourself.”159
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Perceived or felt stigma is more likely if a woman expresses
ambivalence about her decision.160 The odds of experiencing stigma
increase for women who remain equivocal until the medical appointment
and for women who do not tell their partners about the pregnancy.161
(2) Secrecy
Underreporting of the incidence of abortion is well documented.162
The fact that many women who have abortions keep this information
secret from family and friends is a strong indicator of the social
stigma associated with abortion.163

Recent data found that two out of

three women who have abortions expected to be stigmatized if they told
others about the procedure.164

While most women disclose their

pregnancy to their conception partner, far fewer tell friends “and
less than a quarter tell their parents.”165 Fifty-eight percent of
women reported “they needed to keep [the procedure] secret from
friends and family.”166 One study concludes that as many as seventy
percent of women surveyed felt it was important to keep their abortion
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note 44, at 19.
163

See THE ALAN GUTTMACHER INST., ISSUES IN BRIEF: THE LIMITATIONS OF U.S. STATISTICS ON
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secret from family members.167 Similar data regarding secrecy was
reported even two years after the pregnancy.168 Women who have
previously had children are less likely to admit their decision to
have an abortion for fear of social exclusion.169
The desire to keep an abortion secret correlates to perceived
stigma.170 Some researchers describe this dynamic as “the implicit rule
of secrecy[.]”171 It is common for women to explain their secrecy as a
way of avoiding anticipated negative responses, even from people close
to them.172 Most women report that concealing the abortion from
intimates would be extremely difficult but they felt it was
necessary.173 Some women maintain secrecy specifically because they
expect negative judgments from others.174 More than two-thirds of women
reported that they talked about their abortion either “not at all” or
“only a little bit.”175 Women also select secrecy because of fear of

167
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168
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739.
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consequences beyond disapproval, including banishment from the home or
being prevented from having the abortion.176
Secrecy may have positive and negative consequences.

Concealment

may protect a woman from disapproval and social conflict.177 It may
preserve relationships that could be at risk if the pregnancy and
abortion were disclosed.178 But concealing a stigma or suppressing
disclosure of important events can adversely impact physical and
psychological wellbeing.179 A woman who has an abortion often faces
difficult choices when deciding whether to disclose the procedure.180
As long as abortion remains stigmatized, the psychological costs of
either concealment or disclosure may be significant.181
A woman’s fear that her reputation will suffer if an abortion is
disclosed often perpetuates the desire for secrecy for a very long
time.182 Thus, even though abortion stigma may be episodic, women are
likely to carry the perceived fear of reputational harm long after the
abortion has occurred.183
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The concealment of abortion often has negative economic costs. In
one study, nearly two thirds of women covered by private insurance
chose to pay for the abortion out of pocket, rather than risk
disclosure.184
(3) Racial and Ethnic Identity
The experience of abortion stigma varies considerably by race and
ethnicity.185 One study that stratified data found that non-Black women
were more likely to report perceived and internalized stigma.186 White
women were the most likely to perceive social stigma.187

Hispanics, by

contrast, were most likely to perceive stigma from family and friends
and to conceal an abortion from these intimate relations.188

Although

over half of the Black women in this study did perceive stigma, this
statistic was the lowest percentage among the ethnic groups.189 The
study found that African-American women tend to be more pro-choice
than the general population.190 Black women reported supportive
community dynamics more likely to normalize abortion and less likely
to generate stigma.191
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(4) Religion
Religious affiliation impacts perceived, felt, and enacted
stigma.192 A high percentage of women who have abortions come from
religious communities that disapprove of abortion.193 “[O]ne in five
abortion patients identify themselves as evangelical, fundamentalist
or born-again Christian,” groups that have the strongest anti-abortion
attitudes.194 White Protestants and Hispanic Catholics reported the
highest perceptions of stigma.195

Women with strong religious beliefs

are more likely to internalize negative self-judgments or perceive
community disapproval.196 Guilt is a common response of women with deep
religiosity who have an abortion.197
(5) Geography
Where a woman lives may influence whether she perceives or
internalizes stigma.198 Perceptions of abortion stigma were lower in
the Northeast than in other regions in the country.199

Regardless of

what part of the country, community attitudes toward abortion impact a
woman’s experience of stigma.200 Women from communities with negative
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attitudes toward abortion internalize or fear judgments that reflect
harsh stereotypes of women who abort, including “murderer.”201
(6) Misinformation
Misinformation about the health risks associated with abortion
may increase a woman’s perception or internalization of stigma.202
False claims about the existence of “post-abortion syndrome,” akin to
post-traumatic stress disorder, create fear that abortion presents
significant risk factors.203 Unsubstantiated claims of links between
abortion and breast cancer or abortion and infertility, as well as
post-abortion syndrome, are widely distributed through private and
government sources.204 Dissemination of misinformation is mandated by
law in some states imposing obligations upon medical personnel to
recite legislated scripts as part of the informed consent process.205
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women’s expectations of how well they themselves will cope.” (internal
citation omitted)).
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Id. at 422. For example, in Texas a physician must inform a woman of, among
other things, the medical risks associated with the abortion procedure to be
employed, including risks of infection and hemorrhage, the potential danger
to a subsequent pregnancy and of infertility, and the possibility of
increased risk of breast cancer following an induced abortion; the natural
protective effect of a completed pregnancy in avoiding breast cancer; the
probable gestational age of the unborn child at the time the abortion is to
be performed; and the medical risks associated with carrying the child to
term. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012 (West Supp. 2012).
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The data described above demonstrates that substantial majorities
of women who exercise their right to choose abortion perceive social
stigma attaches to their choice.206 This perception is widespread among
women from many different segments of society.207 Majorities of women
surveyed describe this stigma as moral disapproval for rejecting
maternity.208 The social construction of abortion stigma is influenced
by multiple institutions, including religion, media, law, and
community. Laws restricting abortion may embody the moral disapproval
and gender stereotyping associated with stigma.
V.

Abortion Restrictions and Stigma
Law is a significant mediator of social stigma. Positive law and

judicial decisions may generate or reinforce stigma.209

Courts may

invalidate stigmatizing laws that discriminate or seek to remedy the
harm cause by stigma.210 Sometimes the creation of stigma is deliberate
social policy.211 Legal standards and analysis also serve potent
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See Kumar et al., supra note 25, at 633 (“Women may feel that they are
selfish or immoral because they perceive themselves to be defying familial
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Abortion Stigma, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 293, 328 (2013) (discussing how Roe,
Casey, and Carhart II generated stigma).
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See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954)
(striking down segregation sanctioned by law due to the “detrimental effect
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See, e.g., Burris, supra note 122, at 530 (discussing the Helms amendment,
which prohibited depictions of homosexuality in government funded safe sex
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expressive roles in the generation or diminishment of stigma.212 Casey
sends a powerful message when it claims, “[s]ome of us as individuals
find abortion offensive to our most basic principles of morality[.]”213
The Court’s expressed disgust for late-term abortion in Carhart is
both reflection and generator of abortion stigma.214
Stigma is an integral part of laws restricting access to
abortion. Specialized informed consent laws and waiting periods
reflect cultural stereotypes about a woman’s moral authority.
Mandatory ultrasound laws presume a woman’s decision to terminate a
pregnancy can be changed by subjecting her to an emotionally stressful
environment. Laws restricting abortion based on unsubstantiated claims
of fetal pain deny women moral autonomy. These laws are both source
and consequence of abortion stigma.
The existing legal regime regulating abortion in many states and
at the federal level manifests a circular relationship between law and
abortion stigma, the abortion stigma paradox.

Mounting legal

restrictions on access to abortion contribute to greater social
ambivalence about the morality of abortion. Moral disapproval
generates increased stigma that in turn promotes further restrictions.
Two trends in particular highlight the relationship between laws
restricting abortion and stigma. The first, laws purporting to enhance

212

Id. at 529–30.

213

Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850
(1992).
214

See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 957–60 (2000) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting); Courtney M. Cahill, Abortion and Disgust, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 409, 441 (2013).
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the moral and legal recognition of fetal personhood, work on multiple
levels to generate stigma. These laws include fetal personhood
measures and 20-week bans based on medically unsubstantiated fetal
pain.215 Also included are laws that use language to elevate prenatal
life to personhood by defining prenatal life as a “child.”216 By
equating prenatal life with personhood, these laws are intended to
equate abortion with infanticide, making abortion morally
unacceptable.217 Laws of this type also tap into deeply embedded
stereotypes about woman as mothers, for what kind of woman would
“kill” her “child”?218
The second trend seeks to justify restrictions on abortion as
“protecting” a woman from her decision to terminate a pregnancy.219
Laws of this type presume that a woman who decides to terminate her
pregnancy has made the “wrong” decision and needs to be protected from
the physical and psychological damage that will ensue.220 These
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See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9A-4(a)(3) (2012); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-161105(a)(1)(A) (2005); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-738.10 (West Supp. 2014);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.6(C)(1)(h) (Supp. 2014).
216

GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9A-4(a)(3) (2012), ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-1105(a)(1)(A)
(2005), OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-738.10 (West Supp. 2014); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 40:1299.35.6(c)(1)(h) (Supp. 2014).
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Strickler & Danigelis, supra note 106.
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Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159–60 (2007) (“It is self-evident that
a mother who comes to regret her choice to abort must struggle with grief
more anguished and sorrow more profound when she learns, only after the
event, what she once did not know: that she allowed a doctor to pierce the
skull and vacuum the fast-developing brain of her unborn child, a child
assuming the human form.”).
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The New Politics of Abortion, supra note 110.
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Id. at 1011–14.
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measures are grounded in moral disapproval of abortion and skepticism
about women’s autonomy and judgment and typically rely on medically
unsupported allegations of physical and psychological harm.221 Waiting
periods, “informed consent” provisions intended to change a woman’s
decision, mandatory ultrasounds, bans on methods of late term
abortions and restrictions on medication abortions are common
examples.222
This is not to say that moral disputes over abortion are not
legitimate. Constitutional concerns arise however when the state uses
the weight of its authority to stigmatize women who exercise a
constitutionally protected right. Laws manifesting stigma are likely
to impact a woman’s perception of abortion as well as her decision to
terminate a pregnancy.
VI.

Stigma and Casey
Casey rejects strict scrutiny of laws regulating abortion,

replacing strict scrutiny with the undue burden test.223 The undue
burden test shifts the burden from the state to the plaintiff, making
it more difficult and costly for plaintiffs to prevail.224 The undue
burden test requires the plaintiff to prove that the government
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Id. at 1032.

222

See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36–2153 (West Supp. 2012) (informed
consent); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14–02.1–03.5 (West 2011) (regulating
medication abortions); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1–738.2 (West Supp. 2014)
(informed consent); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012 (West Supp. 2012)
(informed consent).
223

Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874
(1992).
224

Id.
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action, by purpose or effect, places a substantial obstacle before a
woman seeking an abortion.225 Casey pairs this shift to diminished
protection for women’s autonomy with a clear message that the state
may use its considerable power to discourage a woman from terminating
a pregnancy: “a state measure designed to persuade her to choose
childbirth over abortion will be upheld if reasonably related to that
goal.”226
Casey insists that the state’s interest in protecting prenatal
life throughout the pregnancy does not “conflict” with a woman’s right
to terminate the pregnancy.227 But laws designed to discourage women
from choosing abortion are in tension with the undue burden test,
which prohibits laws that by purpose present a substantial obstacle to
the right to choose.228 The distinction between permissible dissuasion
and impermissible obstacle requires a careful analysis of legislative
purpose. The Court has shown little inclination, however, to probe the
government purpose behind restrictions on abortion. Instead it has
demonstrated a willingness to defer to state assertions that
restrictions on access to abortion are intended to protect women’s
health or to show “respect for life.”229

225

Id. at 877.

226

Id. at 878.

227

Id. at 846. But see Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 169-70 (2007)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
228

Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.

229

Carhart, 550 U.S. at 158 (majority opinion).
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Laws intended to discourage a woman from engaging in
constitutionally protected activity may allow the state to achieve
indirectly what it lacks the power to prohibit directly, i.e., banning
abortion. This risk is of particular concern when the state employs
moral disapproval to stigmatize a constitutionally protected decision.
Lawrence v. Texas, and United States v. Windsor, discussed infra,
specifically reject moral disapproval as a basis for regulating a
constitutionally protected liberty.230
Casey legitimizes stigma by expressing moral disgust for
abortion. Casey may defend constitutional support for the right to
choose, but it also states unequivocally, “[s]ome of us as individuals
find abortion offensive to our most basic principles of morality[.]”231
This statement of moral disgust is couched in terms of constitutional
imperative when the Court, reluctantly, concludes that moral
approbation “cannot control our decision” because “[o]ur obligation is
to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code.”232
VII.

Abortion Regulation Since Casey
Casey’s heightened support for laws purporting to protect

prenatal life, including laws that decrease access to abortion, sets
the stage for the government to use moral repugnance and stigma to
dissuade women from abortion. Legislation stigmatizing abortion
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Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573-73 (2003); id. at 582–85 (O’Connor,
J., concurring); United States v. Windsor, 13 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013). But

see Carhart, relying on moral disapproval as a justification for
banning a method of abortion.
231

Casey, 505 U.S. at 850.

232

Id.
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typically treats the procedure, and the woman who chooses the
procedure, as deviant. This perception of deviancy is created through
laws that marginalize the abortion procedure by separating it from
mainstream medical treatment. The woman who opts for abortion is
isolated by her choice. Laws that restrict access to abortion through
extended waiting periods, complex informed consent requirements, and
prohibitions on medication abortions send a message of deviancy.233
Regulations targeting abortion providers and subjecting them to
cumbersome and costly restrictions not borne by other medical
providers are intended, in part, to obscure the fact that early
abortion is both common and safe.234 The differential treatment of
abortion by the state stamps the procedure with the tainted morality
that generates stigma.
Fetal pain laws are an increasingly prevalent example of laws
that serve primarily to stigmatize abortion. A number of states have
passed laws prohibiting abortions, typically after twenty weeks, on

233

For a list of state legislation requiring delays and informed consent, see
Mandatory Delays and Biased Counseling for Women Seeking Abortions, CTR. FOR
REPROD. RIGHTS (Sept. 30, 2010),
http://reproductiverights.org/en/project/mandatory-delays-and-biasedcounseling-for-women-seeking-abortions; see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36–2153
(West Supp. 2012) (informed consent); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14–02.1–03.5 (West
2011) (regulating medication abortions); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1–738.2
(West Supp. 2014) (informed consent); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012
(West Supp. 2012) (informed consent).
234

Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Bryant, 222 F.3d 157, 201 (4th Cir. 2000)
(Hamilton, J., dissenting); see also 10A N.C. ADMIN. CODE 14E.0307 (2013)
(requiring a registered nurse with post-operative or post-partum care
experience be on duty in the clinic whenever patients are present); 10A N.C.
ADMIN. CODE 14E.0207 (2013) (requiring that abortion clinics must provide
eighteen specific components to be in compliance with the minimum
requirements).
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the basis of the alleged ability of the fetus to experience pain.235 A
summary of medical research published by the Journal of the American
Medical Association in 2005 concluded that it is unlikely that a fetus
can experience pain before the third trimester and most likely not
until twenty-nine weeks.236

Laws banning abortions based on fetal pain

seek to recast the abortion debate from the question of fetal
personhood to fetal suffering. Approximately one percent of abortions
are performed after twenty weeks.237 As with the Federal Partial Birth
Abortion ban upheld in Carhart, these bans are likely to have only a
minimal impact on abortion practice. They serve primarily to redefine
the abortion narrative as a visceral reaction to suffering.238 As such,
they seek primarily to associate abortion, and a woman who chooses
abortion, with moral repugnance.
VIII.

Stigma and Moral Disapproval
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See, e.g., James MacPherson, North Dakota governor signs “fetal pain”
measure, USA TODAY (Apr. 16, 2013, 11:38 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/04/16/abortion-fetal-paindakota/2089571/ (“At least 10 states have passed bills banning abortions
after 20 weeks of pregnancy on the premise that a fetus can feel pain at that
stage, but research is split on the theory.”).
236

Susan J. Lee et al., Fetal Pain: A Systematic Multidisciplinary Review of
the Evidence, 294 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 947, 952 (2005); Amanda C. Pustilnik, Pain
as Fact and Heuristic: How Pain Neuroimaging Illuminates Moral Dimensions of
Law, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 801, 844 (2012); see also ROYAL COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS &
GYNAECOLOGISTS, FETAL AWARENESS: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PRACTICE 1
(2010) (describing a report published by the RCOG in 1997 which concluded
that a human fetus did not have the requisite “structural integration of the
nervous system to experience awareness or pain before 26 weeks of
gestation”).
237

Pustilnik, supra note 236, at 843.
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Id. at 842.
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Abortion stigma raises two related constitutional concerns: the
harm caused to the individual from state sanctioned stigma and the
relationship between abortion stigma and gender stereotyping. Evidence
of stigmatic harm or gender stereotyping is relevant to judicial
analysis of undue burden under Casey.
The Supreme Court has addressed the relationship between stigma
and law in cases concerning racial discrimination, criminal
convictions, government employment, paternity determinations, and
involuntary commitments.239 State-generated stigma may present issues
under due process.240 The Court may view state-imposed stigma as a
violation of liberty.241 State reinforcement of negative stereotypes
may raise equal protection concerns.242
In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court, in an opinion by Justice
Kennedy, emphasized the stigmatic harm associated with a law that
criminalized homosexual sodomy.243 Lawrence is highly pertinent

239

See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (racial
discrimination); Bd. of Regents of State Coll. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972)
(employment); Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624 (1977) (employment); Parents
Involved in Cmty. School v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007)
(racial discrimination); Rivera v. Minnich, 483 U.S. 574 (1987) (paternity
discrimination); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (involuntary
commitment).
240

See, e.g., Bd. of Regents of State Coll., 408 U.S. at 573 (asserting that
in instances where an individual’s standing and associations within a
community are at stake or a result of the state’s refusal to employ them, due
process accords the opportunity to refute such a change).
241

See, e.g., id. at 573–75 (“There might be cases . . . that interests in
liberty would be implicated. But this is not such a case.”); Minnich, 483
U.S. at 585 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Addington, 441 U.S. at 425.
242

See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003).

243

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575–76.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2519798

because, as in the abortion cases, it addresses the intersection of
stigma, moral disapproval, liberty, and equal protection. The Court
recognizes “[e]quality of treatment and the due process right to
demand respect for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of
liberty are linked in important respects, and a decision on the latter
point advances both interests.”244 Finding that adult, consenting
homosexuals have a constitutionally protected interest in intimate
relationships, the Court concludes that laws criminalizing sodomy
create stigma that would persist even if the laws were not enforced:
“When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State,
that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject
homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public and in the
private spheres.”245
Moral disapproval, the Court makes clear, is not a sufficient
basis for limiting a constitutional right.246 The Court concludes it
has an obligation to examine legislation limiting constitutional
rights to assure that the law is not based on moral disapproval, and
its stigmatizing consequences: “[i]f protected conduct is made
criminal and the law which does so remains unexamined for its

244

Id. at 575.

245

Id.

246

Id. at 571 (“The issue is whether the majority may use the power of the
State to enforce these views on the whole society through operation of the
criminal law.”).
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substantive validity, its stigma might remain even if it were not
enforceable as drawn for equal protection reasons.”247
Lawrence involves criminal sanctions imposed on constitutionally
protected behavior. Laws restricting methods of late term abortion,
medication abortions, and abortion bans based on fetal pain carry
criminal penalties, although not necessarily for the woman.248

But the

Court’s recent decision in United States v. Windsor249 makes clear that
stigmatic harm results from laws that express moral disapproval of
protected constitutional interests, whether criminal or civil. In
finding the Federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) unconstitutional,
Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, concludes that DOMA has the
purpose and effect of expressing moral disapproval or animus towards
homosexuals.250 This disapproval impermissibly stigmatizes homosexuals:
“[t]he avowed purpose and practical effect of the law here in question
are to impose a disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon
all who enter into same-sex marriages made lawful by the unquestioned
authority of the States.”251
The Court examines the legislative history of DOMA and finds that
its intent to interfere with constitutionally protected rights “was

247

Id. at 575.

248

See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9A-4(a)(3) (2012); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-161105(a)(1)(A) (2005); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-738.10 (West Supp. 2014);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.6(C)(1)(h) (Supp. 2014).
249

United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).

250

Id. at 2693.

251

Id.
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more than an incidental effect[;] [i]t was its essence.”252 Citing to
legislative history, the Court states that the purpose of DOMA was to
express “moral disapproval of homosexuality, and a moral conviction
that heterosexuality better comports with traditional (especially
Judeo-Christian) morality.”253 This “differentiation” demeans the
individuals “whose moral and sexual choices the Constitution
protects[.]”254 The Court concludes that the “principal purpose and the
necessary effect” of DOMA are to “demean,” “disparage,” and “injure”
persons who are in a lawful same-sex marriage.255
Compare these decisions with the majority opinion in Carhart,
also written by Justice Kennedy. Moral disapproval of abortion is the
centerpiece of the opinion. Carhart treats abortion as abhorrent. The
case involves only late-term abortions, but the Court’s disgust with
abortion is more generalized. Carhart expresses this disgust, in part,
by quoting graphic and detailed descriptions of late-term abortions
that simultaneously personalize the fetus and vilify the physician.256
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Id.

253

Id. (internal citations omitted).

254

Id. at 2693 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, pt. 8, at 16 (1996).

255

Id. at 2695-96.

256

Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 138–39 (2007) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 10858 at 3 (2003) (“[T]he surgeon takes a pair of blunt curved Metzenbaum
scissors in the right hand. He carefully advances the tip, curved down, along
the spine and under his middle finger until he feels it contact the base of
the skull under the tip of his middle finger. [T]he surgeon then forces the
scissors into the base of the skull or into the foramen magnum. Having safely
entered the skull, he spreads the scissors to enlarge the opening. The
surgeon removes the scissors and introduces a suction catheter into this hole
and evacuates the skull contents . . . . [The doctor] went in with forceps
and grabbed the baby’s legs and pulled them down into the birth canal. Then
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The decision goes further, upholding the federal law because it
“expresses respect for the dignity of human or life[,]” by prohibiting
a particular method of “killing [a] fetus.”257 The Court describes the
D&E as a procedure “laden with the power to devalue life” and
concludes that banning a particular method of late-term abortion
“implicates . . . ethical and moral concerns.”258 The State is
justified in using “its regulatory power to bar certain procedures and
substitute others, all in furtherance of its legitimate interests in
regulating the medical profession in order to promote respect for
life, including life of the unborn.”259
Carhart’s approval of these moral concerns would justify
overturning constitutional protection of the right to choose, a point
not lost on the dissent.260 For the majority, banning the intact D&E is
a way for the state to publicly convey its moral disgust through
“information concerning the way in which the fetus will be

he delivered the baby’s body and the arms--everything but the head. The
doctor kept the head right inside the uterus . . . . The baby’s little
fingers were clasping and unclasping, and his little feet were kicking. Then
the doctor stuck the scissors in the back of his head, and the baby’s arms
jerked out, like a startle reaction, like a flinch, like a baby does when he
thinks he is going to fall. The doctor opened up the scissors, stuck a highpowered suction tube into the opening, and sucked the baby’s brains out. Now
the baby went completely limp . . . . He cut the umbilical cord and delivered
the placenta. He threw the baby in a pan, along with the placenta and the
instruments he had just used.”).
257

Id. at 157.

258

Id. at 158.

259

Id.

260

Id. at 186 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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killed[.]”261

By accepting this moral argument, Carhart ignores the

relationship between moral disapproval and stigmatic harm.
Carhart uses the language of disgust to promote stigma,
describing the federal law as one that may put a woman on notice of
“what she once did not know: that she allowed a doctor to pierce the
skull and vacuum the fast-developing brain of her unborn child, a
child assuming the human form.”262 The Court acknowledges the
connection between abortion stigma and deterrence of the exercise of
the woman’s right, asserting, “[i]t is a reasonable inference that a
necessary effect of the regulation and the knowledge it conveys will
be to encourage some women to carry the infant to full term, thus
reducing the absolute number of late-term abortions.”263 This
statement, grounded in moral disapproval, ignores the fact that most
late-term abortions are performed for medical or health reasons.264
Justice Ginsburg criticizes the hostility to the exercise of
choice embodied in the law and in the majority’s approval of that
hostility.265 She argues the ban does not serve to protect prenatal
life because “[t]he law saves not a single fetus from destruction for
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Id. at 159 (majority opinion).

262

Id. at 159–60.

263

Id. at 160.

264

Brief of the American Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Respondents at 10–16, Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124
(2007) (No. 05–380, 05-1382), 2006 WL 2867888, at *10-16.
265

Carhart, 550 U.S. at 186 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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it targets only a method of performing abortion.”266 Justice Ginsburg
concludes, when “a statute burdens constitutional rights and all that
can be said on its behalf is that it is the vehicle that legislators
have chosen for expressing their hostility to those rights, the burden
is undue.”267
Justice Ginsberg’s dissent highlights the relationship between
abortion stigma and the undue burden test. State regulation of
abortion based on moral disapproval generates stigma. Data shows that
a majority of women perceive or experience abortion stigma and that
stigma deters some women from seeking abortion.268 Stigmatic harm thus
is relevant to judicial analysis of both the purpose and effect prongs
of the undue burden test.
Planned Parenthood Southeast, Inc. v. Strange269 emphasizes the
importance of stigma to analysis of undue burden. The judicial inquiry
should consider, “whether, examining the regulation in its real-world
context, the obstacle is more significant than is warranted by the
State’s justifications for the regulation.”270 The court identifies
five factors to be considered in assessing the significance of the
obstacle.

These factors include the social, cultural, and political

context of the regulation, for “an atmosphere of disapproval and

266

Id. at 181.

267

Id. at 191.

268

Id. at 182-83.

269

2014 WL 1320158 (M.D. Ala. 2014).

270

Id. at *13.
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stigma surrounding the provision of abortion services may decrease the
likelihood that women will be able to access abortion services[.]”271
Stigma also is relevant to another factor identified by court,
analysis of the kind of harms created by the regulation.

Here the

court emphasizes that an “obstacle” refers to an array of harms beyond
direct barriers, including experience of humiliation or emotional
trauma.272
Abortion stigma also may be closely tied to gender
stereotyping.273 Abortion restrictions based on gender stereotypes
create an undue burden under Casey.
IX.

Stigma and Gender Stereotyping
The generation and reinforcement of stigma has been a significant

issue in the Court’s analysis of equal protection.

The decision in

Brown v. Board of Education274 rests largely on the Court’s conclusion
that racially segregated schools stigmatized black children.275 The
Court has recognized that stigma can have a “very significant impact
on the individual[,]” including adverse social consequences.276 State

271

Id. at *15.

272

Id. at *11.

273

Carhart 550 U.S at 185-86 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

274

347 U.S. 483 (1954).

275

Brown, 347 U.S. at 494. R.A. Lenhardt argues that racial stigma, not
intentional discrimination, is the source of racial injury. R.A. Lenhardt,
Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 803 (2004).
276

Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979); see also Patterson v. New
York, 432 U.S. 197, 226 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting) (heat of passion and
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generated stigma has been a basis for the Court to criticize laws that
promote affirmative action, particularly for the stigmatic harm that
occurs through stereotyping.277
The moral disapproval at the core of abortion stigma is
integrally tied to gender stereotyping.278 Although moral opposition to
abortion does not necessarily relate to gender roles, most legal
treatment of abortion implicates gender constructs.279 Efforts to
restrict access to abortion are grounded largely in the assumption
that the protection of prenatal life and its potentiality justifies
almost any burden placed upon the woman.280 This assumption in turn
rests upon the view that pregnancy and childbirth are the “norm”;
abortion is the deviant decision.281 Research shows a strong
correlation between opposition to abortion and support for traditional

its effect on the stigma of conviction); Beard v. Stahr, 370 U.S. 41, 42–45
(1962) (per curiam) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (dismissal with stigma in the
armed forces).
277

See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)
(“Classifications based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm.”); id. at
516 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“There is a special irony in the stereotypical
thinking that prompts legislation of this kind. Although it stigmatizes the
disadvantaged class with the unproven charge of past racial discrimination,
it actually imposes a greater stigma on its supposed beneficiaries.”);
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 373 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part) (stigma that affirmative action advances blacks who
“may be deemed ‘otherwise unqualified’”); Parents Involved in Cmty. School v.
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748–82 (2007) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
278

A Reply to Jeffrey Rosen, supra note 38, at 65.

279

Id.

280

See id.

281

Abrams, supra note 209, at 333.
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gender roles.282 Kristin Luker, in her foundational research on
abortion attitudes, describes the controversy over abortion as “a
referendum on the place and meaning of motherhood.”283
States impose no special requirements if a woman chooses to
become a mother, with all the enormous financial, psychological and
physical hardship that may bring.284 Nowhere is that distinction more
obvious than in the laws governing the right of a minor to choose
abortion.285 Most states mandate some type of parental or judicial
involvement in a minor’s decision to terminate a pregnancy, including
requiring consent of a parent or a judicial officer.286 By contrast, a
minor is free to make the decision to become a mother without the
involvement of the state in her choice.287
Gender stereotypes underlie abortion regulations that provide
exceptions for rape, incest, or serious medical risks for the woman.288
These exceptions belie the state’s argument that prenatal life must
always prevail over the woman’s interest. This good abortion/bad

282

See, e.g., KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 200 (1984).

283

Id. at 193.

284

See Abrams, supra note 209, at 330-37.

285

See GUTTMACHER INST., State Policies in Brief: An Overview of Minors’ Consent
Law, http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_OMCL.pdf (last updated
Mar. 1, 2014).
286

Id.

287

See id.

288

See, e.g., Hyde Amendment, supra note 117.
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abortion binary reflects judgment about when a woman may be “excused”
from fulfilling the maternal role.289
Casey acknowledges these deeply embedded stereotypes when it
concludes, “[h]er suffering is too intimate and personal for the State
to insist, without more, upon its own vision of the woman's role,
however dominant that vision has been in the course of our history and
our culture.”290 Casey also recognizes the connection between
reproductive choice and equality when it explains that “[t]he ability
of women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the
Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their
reproductive lives.”291 This language leaves little doubt of the
connection between abortion regulation, liberty, and antisubordination principles embodied in the Equal Protection Clause.
The anti-stereotyping principle animates the Court’s analysis of
gender discrimination.292 In Nevada Department of Human Resources v.
Hibbs,293 the Court, in upholding the constitutionality of the
mandatory leave provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act,
accepted Congressional findings of widespread employment
discrimination against women based on “pervasive presumption[s] that

289

SMITH & SON, supra note 17, at 6-7.

290

Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852
(1992).
291

Id. at 856.

292

United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996); see also Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
293

538 U.S. 721 (2003).
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women are mothers first[.]”294 Laws that embody these presumptions,
including abortion restrictions, should be carefully scrutinized. The
prevalence of stigma associated with abortion is relevant to judicial
consideration of whether gender stereotyping is occurring.
The Court’s refusal to consider classifications based on
pregnancy as gender-based hinders arguments that abortion restrictions
should be evaluated as gender discrimination under the Equal
Protection Clause.295 But the Court can evaluate abortion restrictions
for impermissible gender stereotyping without specifically holding
that laws restricting abortion create gender classifications. Casey
and Lawrence make clear how equality principles may animate analysis
of constitutional liberty. Lawrence explicitly draws the connection
between liberty and equality, asserting, “[e]quality of treatment and
the due process right to demand respect for conduct protected by the
substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in important respects . .
. ”296 Substantive due process, by policing the outer limits of
permissible government regulation, prevents the majority from defining
liberty in a way that benefits only social majorities. This liberty,
as described in Casey and Lawrence, is grounded in personal identity.
As the Court explains in Casey, “[a]t the heart of liberty is the

294

Id. at 736.

295

See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494–96 (1974). But see Reva B.
Siegel, You’ve Come a Long Way, Baby: Rehnquist’s New Approach to Pregnancy
Discrimination in Hibbs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1871, 1897–98 (2006) (arguing the
Court after Hibbs may be more receptive to considering abortion restrictions
as gender based classifications).
296

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003).
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right to define one’s own concept of existence . . . . Beliefs about
these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they
formed under compulsion of the State.”297
Restrictions on abortion that seek to “encourage” a woman to
continue her pregnancy select a class of women exercising the
constitutionally protected choice of “whether to bear and beget a
child” and stigmatize the choice to end, rather than continue, the
pregnancy. This stigma derives in large part from gender-constructed
stereotypes about women’s roles. Thus evidence of stigma is relevant
to determining whether abortion restrictions reflect gender
stereotyping and thus constitute an undue burden under Casey.
Conclusion
Abortion stigma is culturally constructed and imposed.
Generation of stigma to express moral disapproval is a common social
strategy to constrain behavior. Moral disapproval may be a sufficient
basis to regulate a good deal of social behavior, but it is not a
permissible choice for government to use moral disapproval to
stigmatize individuals who exercise a constitutionally protected
right. The Court has shown concern with government-generated stigma in
areas other than reproductive autonomy. It also has rejected efforts
by the government to rely on moral disapproval as grounds for
impairing the exercise of constitutional rights. Evidence of stigma is
relevant to judicial analysis of laws regulating abortion.
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Restrictions on abortion present substantial issues of stigmatic harm
and gender stereotyping. These issues merit the serious attention of
the courts.
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